A delicate balance : constructing an intellectual property regime that promotes both innovation and social welfare by Aaron Steelman
I
n January, the Supreme Court considered
what the Framers of the United States
Constitution had in mind when they
granted Congress the power “To promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries.” In
particular, the Court had to determine what
the Framers meant by the term “limited.” 
The country’s first intellectual property
laws established copyright terms of 14
years, renewable once. Over time, those
terms have been extended 11 times, most
recently in 1998, when Congress passed the
Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA). 







BY AARON STEELMANThe CTEA, often called the “Sonny
Bono Act” after the late congressman
from California who championed the
law, added 20 years to all copyright terms.
That means copyrights are now pro-
tected for the lifetime of a work’s creator
plus 70 years following death, and copy-
rights held by corporations are good for
95 years. After a copyright expires, the
property enters the “public domain.”
Eric Eldred, a New Hampshire pub-
lisher who posts on his Web site liter-
ature that has entered the public
domain, challenged the law, arguing
that the CTEA sets terms that are
neither “limited” nor necessary to
promote the “Progress of Science and
useful Arts.” What it did instead, he
claimed, was give an unfair monopoly
grant to a few copyright holders at the
expense of millions of potential con-
sumers. In other words, Walt Disney
Co. would benefit from the CTEA,
because without copyright extension
some of Disney’s most famous images,
such as Mickey Mouse, would have
entered the public domain. But people
who would like to read, say, an out-of-
print but still copyrighted Robert Frost
poem would be hurt, because Eldred
and other online publishers would not
be allowed to post it electronically.
The Supreme Court wasn’t per-
suaded by the case presented by Eldred
and his attorney, Lawrence Lessig of
Stanford Law School. It upheld the
CTEAby a vote of 7-2. But the issue of
how to design an optimal intellectual
property rights regime is still a pressing
issue for economists and legal scholars.
F
or as long as laws have aimed at
protecting intellectual property,
disputes have raged over which
work to protect, for how long, and to what
extent,” write Stanley Besen and Leo
Raskind in an introduction to a
symposium on intellectual property
published in the Journal of Economic
Perspectives. And while economists may
differ over the details, most agree in
principle “that economic efficiency
requires government support for
innovative and creative activity.”
There have been some notable dis-
senters, though. In 1934, the distin-
guished British economist Arnold Plant
argued against both copyright and
patent protections. His case was
straightforward: Economists generally
oppose state grants of monopoly priv-
ilege, so why should intellectual prop-
erty be any different? The “evils of
monopoly,” Plant maintained, extend
to all spheres of economic activity, and
“the science of economics as it stands
today furnishes no basis of justifica-
tion” for exceptions to that rule. 
Many authors are not driven by
profit, Plant argued, and thus copyright
protection provides no incentive to
them. It only drives up the cost of their
works. “There is … an important group
of authors who desire simply free pub-
lication; they may welcome, but they
certainly do not live in expectation of,
direct monetary reward. Some of the
most valuable literature that we possess
has seen the light in this way. The writ-
ings of scientific and other academic
authors have always bulked large in this
class,” he wrote. “For such writers copy-
right has few charms. Like public
speakers who hope for a good Press,
they welcome the spread of their ideas.
Erasmus went to Basle in 1522, not
apparently to expostulate with Frobe-
nius for daring to print his manuscript
writings, but to assist the printer in the
good work. The wider the circulation,
the more universal the recognition the
author would receive.”
Still, Plant did concede that more
“authors write books because copyright
exists, and a greater variety of books is
published.” However, “there are fewer
copies of the books which people want
to read.” He advocated a gradual elim-
ination of copyright protection. The
first step would be to reduce the copy-
right term from the life of the author
plus 25 years (the standard at the time
Plant was writing) to five years after
first publication. Such a change would
help to “ensure low prices for books as
early as possible after the fate of the
first edition has revealed that a demand
exists for them.”
In  the 1950s, economist Fritz
Machlup, then of Johns Hopkins Uni-
versity, expressed ambivalence about
the utility of the patent system. No one
could “possibly state with certainty that
the patent system, as it now operates,
confers a net benefit or a net loss upon
society,” he stated. And if one does not
know whether a system is good or bad,
the safest policy “is to ‘muddle through’
— either with it, if one has lived long
with it, or without it, if one has lived
without it. If we did not have a patent
system, it would be irresponsible, on
the basis of our present knowledge of
its consequences, to recommend insti-
tuting one. But since we have had a
patent system for a long time, it would
be irresponsible, on the basis of our
present knowledge, to recommend
abolishing it.”
Similarly, Princeton University econ-
omist Robert Hurt registered his
doubts about copyright protection in a
1966 article for the American Economic
Review. The “traditional assumption
that copyrights enhance the general
welfare is at least subject to attack on
theoretical grounds; the subject cer-
tainly deserves more investigation and
less self-righteous moral defense.”
Recently, economists Michele
Boldrin of the University of Minnesota
and David Levine of the University of
California at Los Angeles have taken
up this challenge and developed a
model that they argue demonstrates
that “current legislation on copyrights,
licensing, and patents plays a harmful
role in the innovation process.” In addi-
tion to the example of the aspiring




















Stanford University law professor
Lawrence Lessig argued before the
Supreme Court that the Copyright Term
Extension Act was unconstitutional.
“author cited by Plant, they discuss
basic scientific research, open source
software development, and innovation
in the fashion industry, all of which
continue to proceed without intellec-
tual property protection. Moreover,
they question whether many musicians
would stop composing, producing, and
recording music should the copyright
regime be eliminated. Some economists
have argued that Boldrin and Levine’s
model makes unrealistic assumptions.
Yet most agree it is a serious challenge
to mainstream thinking on the law and
economics of intellectual property. (For
a nice discussion of Boldrin and
Levine’s paper and its critics, see
Douglas Clement’s article “Was
Napster Right?” in the September 2002
issue of The Region, published by the
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.)
A
nd if there is one figure who could
be said to represent such
mainstream thinking it is Richard
Posner, a lecturer at the University of
Chicago Law School and judge on the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
Posner, along with his Chicago colleagues
Ronald Coase, Richard Epstein, and
William Landes, essentially founded the
modern law and economics movement,
which attempts to use the findings of social
science to make the law more efficient.
To  Posner, property rights are purely
instrumental. They are valuable
because, in general, they enhance social
welfare. But when the cost of creating
or enforcing a particular property right
is especially high, he contends, that
right should be withheld. Consider the
extreme case of a hiker who has strayed
from his course and is without food or
shelter. If he stumbles along a vacant
house and breaks in to save his life, in
general the state will not prosecute
him. The benefit of saving his life out-
weighs the cost inflicted on the prop-
erty owner. Now consider a more
mundane case: parking lots at shopping
malls. Those lots are generally privately
owned and the owners could, by right,
charge people to park in them. But
they usually don’t. The reason: It is
better for the shopping malls’ mer-
chants to effectively treat their parking
lots as common pastures, because it
encourages more people to visit their
stores than if there were a fee to park.
Such a principle sometimes applies
in the case of intellectual property too.
Consider music. People often make
tapes or burn compact discs of offi-
cially released music to give to their
friends. Technically, this is a violation
of copyright. But the music industry
hasn’t aggressively prosecuted people
who engage in this practice. (The
industry has, of course, gone after file-
sharing Web sites that make such music
available to literally millions of poten-
tial listeners, though.) The reason: The
cost of prosecution is just too high. It
is hard to track down all the unautho-
rized tapes and burned CDs out there.
And, what’s more, those tapes and
burned CDs often create a following
for an upstart band. The recipients may
decide that they really like what they
hear and go out and buy more of that
band’s official releases. Indeed, this is
precisely what happened in the case of
several “alternative rock” groups who
played mainly on college campuses,
before tape-swapping made them
national figures. It also is true of J.R.R.
Tolkien’s brilliant trilogy, The Lord of
the Rings. In the 1960s, when the books
were acquiring cult status, especially in
England, unauthorized copies made
their way onto the market. Many
enthralled readers eventually turned to
the real deal and bought the author-
ized versions. Whether Tolkien, his
estate, and his publisher were made
better off by the distribution of illegal
copies is unclear, but a good case could
be made that they were.
Indeed, such examples have bol-
stered the arguments of people who
wish to see intellectual property pro-
tections eliminated. One line of argu-
ment goes like this. The use of
intellectual property — unlike physical
property — does not reduce the value
of its use by another. Put more formally,
the marginal cost of intellectual prop-
erty — the expense of adding one more
user — is very low and can even be neg-
ative in certain cases. So why not make
property available to anyone who
wanted to use it, since optimal output
is generally achieved by equating price
to marginal cost? (A monopoly, in con-
trast, typically sets price above marginal
cost, resulting in “too little” output.)
Posner acknowledges the charm of
this argument. But he says that “such
a policy would be disastrous.” It would,
he argues, “kill the incentive to create
the intellectual property in the first
place, outside of the relatively rare
cases in which the creators have pow-
erful nonmonetary incentives to create
such property, or in which its creation
is financed other than by sale or lease
of the property (by taxation, for
example, or charitable donation —
such as the patronage of authors by
wealthy people, in the old days.) We
need not suppose that most creative
people are greedy to realize that if they
cannot obtain a pecuniary benefit from
producing intellectual property, they
will not be able to finance the costs
(including the costs of their time)
required to produce it.”
Still, this does not mean that the
duration of copyrights and patents
should be boundless. There are many
reasons why this is true. One of the
more significant is the “tracing problem.”
Unlike physical property, intellectual
property is not visibly distinct. It is rel-
atively easy to say where one piece of
land ends and another begins. But it is
much harder to do the same with ideas.
Ideas, by their very nature, build on one
another in a cumulative process. Great
writers, musicians, and scholars usually
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Richard Posner of the University of
Chicago maintains that a system of
“indefinitely renewable copyrights”

































Ldon’t come up with their thoughts out
of thin air. They are inspired and influ-
enced by their predecessors.
Posner puts the tracing problem this
way: “If copyright were perpetual,
James Joyce or his publisher would have
become embroiled in litigation with
the heirs of Homer over whether
Ulysses infringed  The Odyssey, and
Leonard Bernstein with the heirs of
Ovid over whether West Side Story
infringed Pyramus and Thisbe (not to
mention Romeo and Juliet and AM i d -
summer Night’s Dream, themselves
arguably infringements of Ovid’s story).
If  patents were perpetual, heirs of
Leonardo da Vinci would be litigating
over rights to basic aircraft technology.” 
Another reason to limit copyright
protection is that doing so may increase
the “distribution and hence use of intel-
lectual property.” Indeed, this is the
crux of the argument made by Eldred
and by 17 economists (including five
Nobel laureates) who filed a “friend of
the court” brief, arguing that the CTEA
was economically inefficient.
E
xtending copyright by 20 years, the
economists maintained, provides
little incentive for the production
of new works. The reason: The further
away in time a royalty is paid, the less that
payment is worth in present value.
Consider the case of an author who writes
a book and lives for 30 more years. Under
the pre-CTEA copyright regime, “the
author or his assignee would receive
royalties for 80 years. If the interest rate is
7 percent, each dollar of royalties from
year 80 has a present value of $0.0045.
Under the CTEA, this same author will
receive royalties for 100 years. Each dollar
of royalties from year 100 has a present
value of $0.0012.”
What’s more, extending copyright for
existing works “makes no significant con-
tribution to the author’s economic incen-
tive to create, since in this case the
additional compensation was granted
after the relevant investment had already
been made.” It does, however, provide a
significant benefit to those copyright
holders who can continue to make
money from their intellectual property.
But the number of such copyright
holders is relatively small. Most of the
intellectual property that would have
entered the public domain in the absence
of copyright extension is out of print.
Indeed, according to Eldred’s attorney,
Lawrence Lessig, only 2 percent of the
work copyrighted between 1923 and 1942
remains commercially viable. The other
98 percent presumably could have been
posted on Web sites like Eldred’s without
harming anyone, except, perhaps, a few
used book stores.
W
hat can be done? The
prescription offered by
economists Boldrin and
Levine is unlikely to be adopted.
Intellectual property protection is here to
stay. But are there ways to design a system
that would improve overall welfare without
drawing the ire of powerful media
companies like Walt Disney and AOL
Time Warner? Lessig has come up with a
proposal that he thinks might fly. In an
opinion piece for The New York Times he
floated the following idea: Fifty years after
a work’s creation, copyright holders would
be required to pay an annual tax to keep
that work from entering the public
domain. If the tax is not paid for three
years in a row, then copyright protection
would expire, and anyone “would then be
free to build upon and cultivate that part
of our culture as he sees fit.”
The CTEA’s major supporters
shouldn’t have any complaint about
such a proposal, Lessig says. “All of
them argued that they needed the term
increased so they could continue to get
revenue from their works that sup-
ported their other artistic endeavors.
But if a work is not earning any com-
mercial return, then the extension is
pointless.” This compromise would put
fewer works into the public domain
than if the Supreme Court had ruled
the CTEA unconstitutional. “But it
would nonetheless make available an
extraordinary amount of material. If
Congress is listening to the frustration
that the Court’s decision has created,
this would be a simple and effective
way for the First Branch to respond.”
Lessig’s proposal is very similar to
one made by Posner. The major differ-
ence is the size of the tax involved.
Lessig would keep it small, so that
holders of copyrights to material that
is not commercially viable could
protect their intellectual property if
they wished. Posner would make the
tax high, so as to discourage such
actions. But they agree that a politi-
cally feasible solution lies in a system
of “indefinitely renewable copyrights.”
A
t heart, the matter of intellectual
property comes down to an issue
of competing interests. On the
one hand, we want to encourage
innovation and artistic creation. On the
other hand, we want as many people to
have access to as much material as possible.
The task is to create a legal regime that
strikes the right balance. 
And this, writes Posner, “requires a
comparison of these benefits and costs
— and really, it seems to me, nothing
more. The problems are not concep-
tual; the concepts are straightforward.
The problems are entirely empirical.
They are problems of measurement.”
That may well be true. But such prob-
lems are not trivial. In fact, as Posner
admits, they are “acute.” Economists
and legal scholars have their work cut
out for them — but it is work that
could yield huge societal benefits.  RF
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